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## **Confucius meets Weber or “Managerialism takes all”?** **Comparing Civil Servant Values in China and the Netherlands**

### **Abstract**

This paper assesses the validity of normative claims on how civil servant values in East Asian and Western European administrations differ. By triangulating quantitative and qualitative survey data from a sample of Chinese (n=508) and Dutch (n=238) civil servants we aim to answer two main research questions: “How and why do ideal-type and real-life rankings of civil servant values differ between Chinese and Dutch civil servants?” and “Do differences reflect administrative traditions of both countries?” Our findings demonstrate that similarities exceed differences between value rankings. Surprisingly, ideal-type value rankings are more similar than real-life rankings, with only few idiosyncratic differences reflecting administrative traditions. Chinese civil servants perceive institutional and systemic factors as reasons for incongruence between ideal-type and real-life rankings whereas Dutch civil servants emphasize meso-level factors such as organizational public management reforms. We theorize on our results and we provide suggestions for future research.

**Key words:** Public Values, China, The Netherlands, Administrative Traditions, Public Management

## INTRODUCTION

Normative assumptions and traditional stereotypes characterize most debates on administrative cultures in East Asia and Western Europe. Two contrasting views dominate. The *dichotomous* view suggests civil servants in both spheres hold different values engrained in antithetical traditions with regard to the role of the state, stages of democracy, individual versus collective freedoms, and power distance (e.g., Berman 2011; Hofstede 1980; Schwartz 1999). In this view, civil servants in East Asian bureaucracies are obedient, subservient functionaries who focus on building the right personal relationships with superiors to advance their careers. Their collectivist and “people-oriented” approach is conducive to helping their fellow citizens but also breeds favoritism and corruption, and a reluctance to speak truth to power due to fear of “losing face”. On the contrary, civil servants in Western European administrations are seen as relatively incorruptible, rule-abiding, and effective yet distant and “managerial” professionals who hardly encounter regular citizens, let alone join the ranks of government to help particular constituents. They are technocratic experts who operate by – and sometimes hide behind – the rules. Such technocrats respect the *function rather than the person* of their hierarchical superior, and consider their loyalty and autonomy to be protected by law (cf. Rohr 1978).

The second view emphasizes increasing *convergence* or even universalism of practices and values as a result of the “global public management revolution” (Kettl 2005, 1), often referred to as New Public Management (NPM) since the 1980s. Recently, Mahbubani (2013) has written on the “great convergence” between Asia and the West due to increasing exchanges of management ideas and best practices, and almost universal acceptance of Western good governance values. More specifically, Xue and Zhong (2012, 284) suggest NPM-like reforms have affected administrative culture in China while Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, 291-293) make a similar case for the Netherlands. According to Xue and Zhong (2012, 284-285), “China has learned a great deal from international experiences in public administration reform” and is transitioning from “a public administration system based on personal will and charisma to one that is increasingly based on rule of law”. Some even claim such a system is preferable to achieve better governance (e.g., Zheng 2009; Guo 2008; Wei 2010); implying Western-inspired transition should be embraced rather than rejected on particularistic grounds. Conversely, in Western Europe “new” or NPM-values such as innovativeness, profitability, and serviceability are often seen as detrimental to “classical” Weberian values such as expertise, lawfulness, and loyalty (Kernaghan 2000; Van der Wal 2013a).

In both views statements are intertwined on how values *actually* look like and how they *should* look like. Empirical comparative data is almost non-existent. Our comparative study of Chinese and Dutch civil servants aims to provide such data. Findings show that strong dichotomous, stereotypical characterizations do not adequately reflect civil servants’ *ideal-type* value preferences. Although major differences between rankings of cooperativeness, transparency, and accountability reflect common assumptions about differences between governance traditions, most of the top ranked values are shared between both groups. *Real-life* value preferences show slightly larger differences, refuting the universalism hypothesis as well. Interestingly, in their *mutual perceptions* a majority of respondents reinforce traditional stereotypes in support of the dichotomous view. Finally, civil servants in both countries experience *different value dynamics*: Dutch civil servants are cynical about the impact of NPM-reforms on values they consider important whereas Chinese civil servants feel that systemic factors disable them to enact ideal type values. In short, our findings nuance current normative debates and they provide intriguing avenues for more systematic reflection and specific follow-up studies.

Before we proceed, however, we should be mindful of the limitations of our study. First, we knew beforehand our sample would not be large enough to generalize conclusions to entire countries and administrative spheres even though this is not our key aim. Still, we are hesitant at this point to unambiguously refute current theory or propose substantial alternative theories; rather, we offer incremental contributions to the study of civil servant values in Eastern and Western spheres. Second, as in many Social Science studies our methods of choice strongly influence content, and vice versa. Put shortly: “the content *is* the method” (King *et al.* 1994, 7). Our study employs a combination of approaches, one certainly not undisputed and thus perhaps used less frequently than it is called for. However, our qualitative findings complement and clarify our quantitative findings which inevitably suffer from common method biases (cf. Podsakoff *et al.* 2003).

The structure of our paper is as follows. First, we provide a literature review of civil servant values and administrative traditions with emphasis on China and The Netherlands, resulting in six research propositions. We then explain how we derived a value set to employ as a survey instrument. Then, we report on our measures, respondent selection, and empirical results. After we discuss our findings and the limitations of our study we aim to answer our research questions:

*How and why do ideal-type and real-life value rankings differ between Chinese and Dutch civil servants, and do differences reflect administrative traditions of both countries?*

## **CIVIL SERVANT VALUES AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS**

Values are essentially contested concepts. They may refer to “interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations...” and so forth (Williams 1968, 283). However, a commonality in most definitions is reference to a “preference” and a demand that can be “ordered by relative importance” (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, 551). Each value, such as honesty or transparency, is of particular importance to a person, making it possible to rank values by relative importance (Rutgers 2008; Van der Wal 2013a).

Our focus lies with *civil servant values*, an operational subset of public values (Bozeman 2007, 13) constituting precepts for public sector employees and their relationship with politicians, colleagues, and citizens, such as political loyalty, impartiality, accountability, professionalism, and integrity (cf. Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman 2007, 368-9). Investigating a value system of any group is impossible without paying attention to context and tradition. These deeper factors function as “underlying roots” (Painter and Peters 2010, 4), which drive individuals to act in a certain way. Five central features characterize tradition:

1. Tradition is an inheritance or heritage which is passed down with a sense of continuity from past to present and from generation to generation (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Gross 1992);
2. With regard to material objects, tradition includes the normative, spiritual or moral aspects carried by these objects (Smelser and Baltes 2001);
3. Tradition refers to beliefs, attitudes, values and patterns of behavior, as well as laws, codes and institutions (Einsenstadt 1973);
4. Traditions shape individual or collective value systems which guide the decisions, interpret actions, and affect their moral judgments (Seligman and Johnson 1937; Gross 1992);
5. Tradition may have a minimal level of conceptual consistency during its transmission and can be open to change, suggesting that some traditional ways of thinking and practices might not be applicable at present (Smelser and Baltes 2001; Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003).

Administrative traditions explain how administrations originate and develop. According to Painter and Peters (2010, 6-8) “an administrative tradition is a more or less enduring pattern in the style and substance of public administration in a particular country or group of countries, composed of both ideas and structures”. In the same vein, Yesilkagit (2010) distinguishes between two dimensions as analytically independent attributes: traditions as embodied by *structures* and *ideas*. Clearly, administrative and political structures and deep-seated ideas about government and governance differ greatly between the two countries we study. However, studying current perceptions and attitudes of public officials may show us whether traditions are evolving, how strong they are in terms of conceptual consistency, and subsequently, how structures may evolve accordingly (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

More specifically, this study is situated in a context of Confucian “rule of morality” and Continental “rule of law” traditions. According to Painter and Peters (2010, 20), the Netherlands falls into the category of “Western administrative traditions” which includes Anglo-American, Napoleonic, Germanic and Scandinavian traditions, and China falls into the category of Confucianism “which dominates East Asia’s dominant administrative traditions” (2010, 26).

### **GENESIS AND NATURE OF CIVIL SERVANT VALUES: CONTRASTING VIEWS**

Indeed, governance traditions of China and The Netherlands are said to be captured by the labels of Confucian “rule of morality” vs. Continental “rule of law” (Fallon 1997). For instance, Cheung (2010, 38) states Chinese traditional culture<sup>1</sup> is ethics-centered and “rule of man”<sup>2</sup> rather than “rule of law” characterizes its administrative system of “Confucian scholar-officialdom”. According to Frederickson (2002), the Confucian ideal of good government rests on a moral “man.” Confucius calls this moral example *junzi* (gentleman):

The good official is above all other things, a moral actor in the context of moral action. All government or public acts are to be thought of as moral acts, and all public officials are understood to be moral actors. The authority for action is not found in law or in delegation from the ruler; it is found in the individual bureaucrat’s personal morality. Political authority should be limited to those who can demonstrate moral and intellectual qualifications. A ruler leads by moral power (Frederickson 2002, 616).

Confucius’s “sage-king,” the moral person enabling good government, is not a lawgiver. Thus, Confucianism’s stance towards laws is ambivalent, perhaps even hostile (Cheung 2010; Winston 2005).

Such views of good governance differ fundamentally from those by earlier Western philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. While Plato’s philosopher-king emphasizes virtues, he also establishes and maintains just laws. Moreover, Plato and Aristotle view the regulation of citizen behavior by law as *means to align* personal virtues with the state or polis in which they can become virtuous. Aristotle even argued “only law has the required compulsory power to ensure moral training of men is accomplished” (350 BC/1980, 271).

Thus, rule of law as a tradition refers to the wide and deep-seated idea of “constitutions and legislative-made laws being the bedrock of Western democratic government” (Frederickson 2002, 614). The law-bound tradition of Western Europe (Van der Meer 2011) is often referred to as *Rechtsstaat* (Morlino and Palombella 2010, 7), a German expression made up of *Recht* (law) and *Staat* (state). Its core ideas are “rationality and strict legality of all administrative actions” (Schram 1971, 7). Max Weber (1921) developed the most well-known administrative and

bureaucratic ideal types of a “good civil servant” within a Rechtsstaat regime. Such a civil servant is a politically neutral, rational, loyal, and professional expert who interprets, formulates, and executes public law on behalf of its political master. As explained by Frederickson (2002, 620): “if public administration is the law in action in a Western context, public administration is morality in action in a Confucian context.” Based on these ideal type traditional differences we formulate proposition one and two:

- P<sub>1</sub> Ideal-type value rankings of both groups show more differences than similarities
- P<sub>2</sub> Differences between ideal-type value rankings of both groups reflect rule of morality and rule of law administrative traditions respectively

One may wonder, however, whether these traditional, antithetical labels are best suited to explain the current civil service ethos in both countries. While “China’s communitarian traditions are based on Confucianism” (De Bary 1998, 8) its precepts were heavily criticized during the Cultural Revolution and partly replaced by or at least blended with the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Concomitantly, the approach of China’s central leadership to combat corruption has evolved from ad-hoc “campaign-style” to “institutionalized integrity management” over the past two decades (Gong 2011, 672-674). As Gong (2011) indicates, the CCP and the Chinese government nowadays do not just rely on moral standards and individual commitment, but also on rule-based strategies. Indeed, conduct of Chinese civil servants was principally regulated by CCP doctrines before implementation of the *State Civil Service Code of Conduct* in 2002 (Zhang 2004). However, nowadays two distinct ethics entities exist: “The party’s discipline inspection commissions oversee party (cadre) officials, whereas the Ministry of Supervision is responsible for the conduct of government officials” (Smith 2004, 311). Their norms and codes are promulgated at multiple levels of government.

Moreover, after three decades of immense socio-economic change since the start of Deng Xiaoping’s open-door era it is unclear which values should nowadays characterize a “good civil servant.” The pledge of China’s new leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang to combat endemic corruption by reinforcing professional ethics and civil service values is testimony to such equivocality; it is in fact an attempt to reinstitute a common perception of proper values.<sup>3</sup> In the same vein, recent proliferation of scholarly debates on public values and concomitant good governance campaigns in The Netherlands (e.g., Van der Wal 2013a) are telltale signs of insecurity about the current state of public sector values. In fact, current sentiment calls for rehabilitation of a traditional Weberian civil service ethos amidst claims of the erosion of such ethos by NPM-inspired “managerialism”.

As noted, some suggest value preferences are converging across the globe due to recent public management reforms (Xue and Zhong 2012; Zhang 2009), while others warn for mistaking popular vocabulary and espoused values propagated by the global “public management industry” for universalism in values-in-use (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). However, directly testing the convergence hypothesis lies beyond our reach as our data are cross-sectional and we cannot build on previous comparative work. Moreover, the topic of study suffers from “values literature confusion” (Agle and Caldwell 1999). For instance, scholars have labeled efficiency as new or NPM value while it is part of Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy, rendering *a priori designation of specific values* as either traditional or new highly problematic (cf. Van der Wal 2013a). At this stage, however, we are able to formulate three additional propositions:

- P<sub>3</sub> Real-life value rankings are more similar between both groups than ideal-type value rankings
- P<sub>4</sub> Both groups of respondents report similar explanations for incongruence between ideal-type and real-life value rankings
- P<sub>5</sub> Explanations of both groups for incongruence between ideal-type and real-life value rankings point towards increased emphasis on managerialism and NPM-inspired public service ethos in the past two decades

Finally, we compare mutual perceptions of value preferences. Doing so is relevant as studies consistently show mutual perceptions of value preferences are more contrasting than actual preferences between groups, thus reinforcing stereotypes (Van der Wal and De Graaf 2007; Van Steden *et al.* 2013). Such reasoning brings us to our sixth and final proposition:

- P<sub>6</sub> Mutually perceived differences between value rankings exceed differences between ideal-type and real-life value rankings of both groups

In the next sections, we explain how we constructed a set of civil servant values, and how we tailored our questionnaire to answer our research questions.

## **METHODOLOGY**

### **Constructing a value set**

Obviously, public administration literature and codes of conduct make reference to hundreds of values, many of which overlap, rendering it impossible to include all. So, which values are crucial and where can we find them? For China, recent studies are non-existent so we decided to start with deriving values from their source; 11 central Confucian characters from the Analects, each translating into multiple values with some overlap, totaling 35.<sup>4</sup> For The Netherlands we used the 30 most important values from Western public administration literature, 13 of which had been used before in surveys among Dutch civil servants (Van der Wal 2013a).<sup>5</sup> Nine values appeared in both lists. Subsequently, 15 municipal civil servants in Shanghai and eight in Amsterdam rated and ranked the values in the respective lists through a pilot study (see Yang and Van der Wal 2014). All values were presented with clear definitions to mitigate interpretation differences.<sup>6</sup>

In addition, we conducted a content analysis of codes of conduct: two state codes, 10 provincial codes, and 14 municipal codes in China<sup>7</sup> and a survey of 59 local and provincial codes (Van der Wal 2013) and data published by OECD (2000) for the Netherlands. Such codes usually offer criteria outlining what government employees should and should not do, i.e., they offer conceptions of the “ideal-type” civil servant (Yang and Van der Wal 2014). In the end, however, all codes combined added only four values to the 56 values already established. We then selected values which appeared in the top 10 of both pilot survey (rate and rank) and codes, resulting in the final set of 25 civil servant values and their definitions shown in Table 1.

**Table 1: Value set and definitions used in questionnaire**

Values
1. <b>Accountability:</b> Act willingly to justify and explain actions to the relevant stakeholders
2. <b>Cooperativeness:</b> Act willingly to work with others and adjust differences to reach agreement
3. <b>Courage:</b> Act bravely to face danger and take risks to pursue what is right
4. <b>Diligence:</b> Act with persistence effort to carry out tasks or duties
5. <b>Equality:</b> Act identically and unbiased to the people who have identical rights
6. <b>Expertise:</b> Act with competence, skill and knowledge
7. <b>Effectiveness:</b> Act to achieve the desired results
8. <b>Efficiency:</b> Act to achieve results with minimal means
9. <b>Honesty:</b> Act truthfully and comply with promises
10. <b>Impartiality:</b> Act without prejudice and bias towards specific group interests
11. <b>Incorruptibility:</b> Act without prejudice and bias towards private interests
12. <b>Innovativeness:</b> Act with initiative and creativity (to invent or introduce new policies or products)
13. <b>(Social) Justice:</b> Act out of commitment to a just society, consistently with what is morally right
14. <b>Lawfulness:</b> Act in accordance with existing laws and rules
15. <b>Loyalty:</b> Act faithfully and with allegiance towards superiors or organizations
16. <b>People-oriented:</b> Act to achieve what is in the interest of the common people
17. <b>Obedience:</b> Act in compliance with the instructions and policies of superiors and the organization
18. <b>Propriety:</b> Act appropriately and in accordance with what is considered suitable to one's identity
19. <b>Prudence:</b> Act carefully and wisely in accordance with sound judgment
20. <b>Reliability:</b> Act trustworthy and consistently towards relevant stakeholders
21. <b>Responsibility:</b> Act willingly and dutifully in making decisions and judgments
22. <b>Responsiveness:</b> Act in accordance with the preference of citizens and customers
23. <b>Righteousness:</b> Act frankly without guilt and adhere to what is morally right
24. <b>Serviceability:</b> Act helpfully and offer quality and service towards citizens and customers
25. <b>Transparency:</b> Act openly, visibly and controllable

### **Selection of respondents and survey distribution**

We distributed questionnaires among participants in professional Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs and civil servants working within different layers of government in China and the Netherlands. We surveyed professional MPA students and their colleagues in Beijing, Chengdu, Shanghai (China), and Amsterdam, Leiden, and the Hague (The Netherlands). In addition, we employed a snowball method to recruit additional respondents (cf. Fowler 2002; Weiss 1995), often colleagues of the students. At best, our approach produced a mix of a random sample and convenience sample of junior and mid-level civil servants – over 75 percent of the respondents in both countries are below 45 years of age – with a minority of more senior officials with supervisory duties and responsibilities (see Table 2). On average, our Dutch respondents are somewhat younger, higher educated, and slightly less experienced than our Chinese respondents.

As such, our respondents make up a broad and general sample that suits our aim: to collect baseline data on how regular civil servants in both countries prioritize civil servant values. By no means do we intend or imply generalizability of our findings to the respective countries. However, comparative data is non-existent and we needed to start somewhere. Moreover, getting access to

reliable data from civil servants in China is notoriously difficult, rendering our sample of 508 Chinese respondents rather unique. In China, the response rate was 86 percent with 591 distributed questionnaires. In the Netherlands, we obtained 235 valid questionnaires out of 314, a response rate of 75 percent. We distributed hardcopy questionnaires in classrooms as well as online by e-mailing a secured link to our respondents.

**Table 2: Respondent Characteristics (in percentages)**

<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>China (n=508)</b>	<b>The Netherlands (=235)</b>
<i>Gender</i>	Male	60,0	48,9
	Female	38,4	45,5
<i>Age</i>	25 years or younger	5,4	14,5
	26-35 years	38,4	36,6
	36-45 years	30,7	26,4
	46-55 years	20,9	14,5
	56 years or older	3,3	2,6
<i>Years on the job as a civil servant</i>	Less than 1 year	9,3	7,7
	1-5 years	17,7	36,0
	6-10 years	15,9	22,6
	11-15 years	14,0	14,5
	16-20 years	12,2	7,7
	Over 20 years	22,4	9,8
<i>Function/ domain of government</i>	Policy-making	5,1	31,9
	Administrative and/or secretarial	20,7	2,6
	Legal, law enforcement, support (incl. police and fire brigade)	9,6	7,7
	IT and technology support	9,3	1,3
	Financial advice and control	6,3	5,1
	Management/supervision	28,5	21,3
	Other	18,1	24,7
<i>Supervisory responsibility</i>	Yes	39,0	28,5
	No	57,9	66,0
<i>Domain of government</i>	Policy formulation and planning	5,7	31,1
	Policy execution	41,3	35,3
	Regulation and oversight	15,4	11,9
	Other	34,3	16,2
<i>Currently Participating in MPA program</i>	Yes	15,4	81,3
	No, but I took a MPA or Public Administration degree before	12,4	7,2
	No, but I have another academic degree	35,8	3,4
	No, and I do not have an academic degree	31,9	2,6



## Questions and measures

First, we asked respondents to select and rank in order of importance five values they “personally considered most important for being a good civil servant.” Then, we asked them to do the same for those values “actually most important in your daily working lives.” This way, we incited a degree of distinction between norm and fact (cf. Lawton 1998), allowing us to compare ideal- type and veritable value preferences. Rating and ranking methods each have advantages and disadvantages (Agle and Caldwell 1999, 367-8). Advocates of rating state that agents in actual decision-making situations attribute equal importance to several different values at once without being aware of possible conflicts (cf. Hitlin and Pavilian 2004; Schwartz 1999). Also, it is easier to statistically compare results. A disadvantage, however, is that the constructed hierarchy is more general when each value is rated, and respondents are not obliged to choose what is really valued most when values conflict (Van der Wal 2008). For these reasons, value ratings are often criticized for producing rather general and even socially desirable answers, reflecting “espoused truisms” rather than genuine value preferences (Van Rekom, Van Riel, and Wierenga 2006, 175). In fact, rankings produce more precise prioritizations and hierarchies of values (Schwartz 1999).

We recoded the scores of the value rankings into reverse scores to be weighed correctly (5 = most important, 1 = least important of the top five). We calculated frequency (number of respondents placing this value *within* the top five), mean scores (based on the ranking of the value *within* the top five), and standard deviations. Then we computed a sum of scores ( $\Sigma$ ) based on frequency as well as rank ( $N*M$ ), and a standardized share ( $\Sigma/n$ ) to enable a comparison between more and less important values between the two groups at the .5 cutoff point (cf. Van der Wal *et al.* 2008; Van der Wal 2013a). A standardized share is an appropriate measure here as it mitigates difference in sample size and explains differences between rankings more adequately than significance of differences between means. The final section of our questionnaire contained three open questions (cf. Van der Wal and Oosterbaan 2013) to elucidate respondents’ perceptions on differences between ideal-type and real-life values, value dynamics in the past 20 years, and mutual value differences between Eastern and Western administrative cultures. We coded and categorized responses into major distinct categories.

## Cross-country research and translation issues

On a final note, conducting cross-national and cross-cultural comparisons inevitably produces translation issues. In Rutgers’s (2004, 155) words, “we can try to understand and capture the authentic or local meaning of social reality in another place, or we may develop our own concepts to interpret and apply, what may be called, a *yardstick or meaning gauge*”. When we interpret answers from Chinese and Dutch respondents in their native languages, we apply the former approach. When we translate English into Chinese and Dutch, we apply the latter. All values in our survey were identically defined and translated accordingly. One of the authors is native Chinese and the other is native Dutch. Therefore, we feel adequately equipped to understand the specific background of respondents and derive appropriate interpretations.

We use the most authoritative and widely cited English translation of the first Confucian works by Legge (1893) which is widely praised by Chinese scholars (Chen 2009): *The Confucian Analects. The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean*. In addition, more recent translations are also used as reference (e.g., Chichung Huang 1997), as some of their phrases lead to more accurate understanding among younger generations.

## RESULTS

This section presents the results of the value ranking exercises. Table 3 shows ideal type value rankings and table 4 displays actual value preferences.

**Table 3: Descriptive statistics for *ideal-type* value rankings**

No.	China (n=503)						The Netherlands (n=228)					
	Value	N	M	SD	$\Sigma$	$\Sigma/n$	Values	N	M	SD	$\Sigma$	$\Sigma/n$
1	<b>Impartiality</b>	229	3.60	1.29	825	<b>1.6</b>	<b>Expertise</b>	113	3.14	1.53	355	<b>1.6</b>
2	<b>Incorruptibility</b>	234	3.26	1.33	763	<b>1.5</b>	<b>Reliability</b>	86	3.30	1.36	284	<b>1.3</b>
3	<b>People-oriented</b>	169	3.31	1.47	560	<b>1.1</b>	<b>Transparency</b>	95	2.88	1.31	274	<b>1.2</b>
4	<b>Lawfulness</b>	156	3.46	1.43	540	<b>1.1</b>	<b>Lawfulness</b>	79	3.18	1.42	251	<b>1.1</b>
5	<b>Expertise</b>	143	2.82	1.30	409	<b>0.8</b>	<b>Impartiality</b>	60	3.17	1.43	190	<b>0.8</b>
6	<b>Efficiency</b>	145	2.57	1.27	373	<b>0.7</b>	<b>Effectiveness</b>	64	2.83	1.32	181	<b>0.8</b>
7	<b>Responsibility</b>	137	2.66	1.42	365	<b>0.7</b>	<b>Accountability</b>	54	3.11	1.54	168	<b>0.7</b>
8	<b>Diligence</b>	118	2.96	1.32	349	<b>0.7</b>	<b>Incorruptibility</b>	51	3.30	1.42	167	<b>0.7</b>
9	<b>Cooperativeness</b>	120	2.80	1.40	336	<b>0.7</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	53	3.11	1.38	165	<b>0.7</b>
10	<b>Serviceability</b>	119	2.78	1.37	333	<b>0.7</b>	<b>People-oriented</b>	45	3.60	1.51	162	<b>0.7</b>
11	<b>Righteousness</b>	97	3.30	1.44	320	<b>0.6</b>	<b>Honesty</b>	51	3.02	1.44	154	<b>0.7</b>
12	<b>Honesty</b>	88	3.58	1.29	315	<b>0.6</b>	<b>Prudence</b>	49	2.96	1.27	145	<b>0.6</b>
13	<b>Effectiveness</b>	95	2.97	1.51	282	<b>0.5</b>	<b>Righteousness</b>	31	3.74	1.41	116	<b>0.5</b>
14	<b>Equality</b>	84	3.13	1.45	263	<b>0.5</b>	<b>(Social) Justice</b>	35	3.00	1.45	105	<b>0.5</b>
15	<b>Innovativeness</b>	99	2.44	1.19	242	<b>0.5</b>	<b>Efficiency</b>	42	2.48	1.35	104	<b>0.5</b>
16	Accountability	76	2.94	1.56	223	0.4	Diligence	37	2.70	1.47	100	0.4
17	(Social) Justice	76	2.79	1.36	212	0.4	Serviceability	43	2.33	1.27	100	0.4
18	Transparency	83	2.26	1.31	188	0.4	Equality	25	3.04	1.43	76	0.3
19	Loyalty	52	3.23	1.46	168	0.3	Propriety	29	2.55	1.30	74	0.3
20	Obedience	48	2.85	1.40	137	0.3	Loyalty	29	2.38	1.05	69	0.3
21	Courage	47	2.68	1.42	126	0.3	Cooperativeness	24	2.58	1.32	62	0.3
22	Prudence	39	2.23	1.06	91	0.2	Innovativeness	25	2.24	1.15	60	0.3
23	Reliability	24	2.21	1.25	53	0.1	Courage	9	3.44	1.51	31	0.1
24	Propriety	15	1.87	1.13	28	0.0	Responsiveness	8	2.88	1.25	23	0.1
25	Responsiveness	12	2.00	1.13	24	0.0	Obedience	1	1.00	0.00	1	0.0

**How *ideal-type* civil servant values differ**

Overall, 10 of 15 most highly ranked values are shared between Chinese and Dutch respondents. “Impartiality” (position one and five) and “expertise” (positions five and one) are ranked highest respectively; in fact, about half of all respondents in both countries ranked “impartiality” or “expertise” among the five values they selected. “Lawfulness” ranks fourth in both hierarchies. Other shared ideal values include “incorruptibility,” “honesty,” “people-oriented,” and “responsibility,” with “incorruptibility” and “people-oriented” ranked higher by Chinese respondents by more than five positions. “Equality,” “(social) justice,” and “loyalty” are ranked relatively low by both groups. Intriguingly, “obedience” is the least important ideal value for Dutch civil servants but it also ranks low in China. “Responsiveness,” meeting wishes and demands of important stakeholders, is ranked at the bottom of the list for both groups.

However, the ideal-type value rankings produce a few striking differences, with “reliability” ranked 23th by our Chinese respondents and 2nd by their Dutch counterparts. Rankings also show large differences for “prudence” and “efficiency,” whose low ranking by Dutch civil servants is unexpected. “Accountability” and “transparency” which received much attention in Western European discourse in recent years and pertain to advanced democratic governance are indeed ranked considerably higher in The Netherlands.

**Table 4: Descriptive statistics for *real-life* value rankings**

No	China (n=495)						The Netherlands (n=221)					
	Value	N	M	SD	$\Sigma$	$\Sigma/n$	Values	N	M	SD	$\Sigma$	$\Sigma/n$
1	<b>Cooperativeness</b>	195	3.04	1.42	593	<b>1.2</b>	<b>Expertise</b>	114	3.35	1.46	382	<b>1.7</b>
2	<b>Incorruptibility</b>	166	3.16	1.42	524	<b>1.1</b>	<b>Lawfulness</b>	92	3.42	1.41	315	<b>1.4</b>
3	<b>Lawfulness</b>	159	3.20	1.36	509	<b>1.0</b>	<b>Effectiveness</b>	77	3.29	1.36	253	<b>1.1</b>
4	<b>Obedience</b>	150	3.39	1.42	508	<b>1.0</b>	<b>Efficiency</b>	66	3.05	1.39	201	<b>0.9</b>
5	<b>Expertise</b>	149	3.19	1.29	475	<b>1.0</b>	<b>Loyalty</b>	55	3.07	1.11	169	<b>0.8</b>
6	<b>Efficiency</b>	151	3.11	1.31	469	<b>0.9</b>	<b>Prudence</b>	61	2.77	1.46	169	<b>0.8</b>
7	<b>Effectiveness</b>	141	3.23	1.46	455	<b>0.9</b>	<b>Reliability</b>	54	2.87	1.33	155	<b>0.7</b>
8	<b>Impartiality</b>	131	3.39	1.26	436	<b>0.9</b>	<b>Transparency</b>	56	2.63	1.47	147	<b>0.7</b>
9	<b>Diligence</b>	123	3.02	1.41	372	<b>0.8</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	52	2.65	1.40	138	<b>0.6</b>
10	<b>Serviceability</b>	139	2.66	1.43	369	<b>0.7</b>	<b>Serviceability</b>	45	2.67	1.35	120	<b>0.5</b>
11	<b>Innovativeness</b>	111	2.82	1.38	313	<b>0.6</b>	<b>Innovativeness</b>	34	3.50	1.31	119	<b>0.5</b>
12	<b>Responsibility</b>	115	2.68	1.38	308	<b>0.6</b>	<b>Accountability</b>	41	2.76	1.43	113	<b>0.5</b>
13	<b>People-oriented</b>	91	3.38	1.31	301	<b>0.6</b>	<b>Diligence</b>	39	2.85	1.63	111	<b>0.5</b>
14	<b>Loyalty</b>	80	3.70	1.40	296	<b>0.6</b>	<b>Propriety</b>	33	3.06	1.40	101	<b>0.5</b>
15	<b>Righteousness</b>	83	2.92	1.48	242	<b>0.5</b>	<b>Cooperativeness</b>	39	2.56	1.37	100	<b>0.5</b>
16	Prudence	77	2.60	1.22	200	0.4	People-oriented	29	3.31	1.57	96	0.4
17	Accountability	71	2.70	1.53	192	0.4	Impartiality	30	3.00	1.50	90	0.4
18	Transparency	83	2.25	1.51	187	0.4	Responsiveness	31	2.65	1.14	82	0.4
19	Honesty	61	2.95	1.36	180	0.4	Obedience	26	2.69	1.44	70	0.3
20	Equality	55	3.09	1.44	170	0.3	Incorruptibility	20	3.15	1.39	63	0.3
21	Reliability	49	2.41	1.19	118	0.2	Equality	21	2.67	1.32	56	0.3
22	(Social) Justice	44	2.41	1.39	106	0.2	Honesty	18	3.06	1.39	55	0.2
23	Propriety	45	2.20	1.22	99	0.2	Courage	19	2.74	1.48	52	0.2
24	Courage	27	3.04	1.40	82	0.2	Righteousness	13	3.23	1.48	42	0.2
25	Responsiveness	19	2.21	1.44	42	0.1	(Social) Justice	15	2.73	1.39	41	0.2

**How *real-life* civil servant values differ**

Here, both groups share eight of their top 15 values using equal cutoff points. Again, our Chinese respondents consider “impartiality” much more important than our Dutch respondents (8th versus 17th position), but it is no longer the top of their list as it was in the ideal-type ranking. Again, “transparency” and “accountability” are among the most prominent values for the Dutch but not for the Chinese respondents. Also here, “reliability” is valued much higher by Dutch respondents (7th versus 21st position). A striking corroboration of popular imagery and traditional disposition

is the fourth position of obedience for our Chinese respondents. However, “loyalty” is ranked higher by their Dutch counterparts. Unexpected to say the least is the high ranking of “incorruptibility” as second most important in China and its low ranking in the Netherlands at the 20th position.

Overall, when compared to ideal-type conceptions, real-life rankings show *different and slightly stronger contrasts* between both groups. The prioritizations displayed here do indeed reflect more realistic and arguably somewhat cynical views of daily civil service life, with honesty, righteousness, and incorruptibility dropping considerably while efficiency, loyalty, and obedience go up. Still, the ranking results leave us somewhat puzzled as to how and why the civil service ethos of both groups differs. The answers on the open questions may help to elucidate and complement these findings.

### **Chinese respondents speak out**

Three hundred Chinese civil servants responded to the first question: “*What makes ideal-type and real-life values different?*” About 36 percent say *institutional* and *societal* conditions constrain ideals. Values are modified or even sacrificed to suit the “cruel reality” or “the function’s requirements.” Respondents in this category find “the ideal-type situation based on a relative harmonious and stable environment whereas the actual situation involves influence and interference,” and “ideal values are the universal requirements whereas actual values are qualities civil servants should have according to societal requirements, their position and responsibility”. Many consider ideal-type values hard to realize because of “imperfection of institutions, laws and regulations,” “institutional flaws and restraints,” “Chinese political ecology,” and, literally, “because in our political system ‘rule of man’ has more weight than ‘rule of law’.” Thirteen percent emphasize *individual* attributes such as “personal morals,” “abilities,” “education,” “cultivation,” and “pursuing individual interests”. An equal portion of respondents think ideal values differ from those enacted in reality because they are not operable. What separates this category from our first one is the emphasis on citizens’ expectations of civil servants to solve practical problems and achieve expected results. According to a civil servant “In reality, most emphasis lies on taking responsibility and effectiveness. For citizens, solving their practical issues is the most important. They don’t need explanations but results. Ideal values are theoretically important but they do not consider actual problems we face.” Much smaller categories of between 3 and 4 percent comprise those in which respondents emphasize in particular “the civil service assessment system”, “pressure from superior and leader,” “importance of interpersonal relationship in real life,” and “influence of tradition and culture.” It is noteworthy that all statements referring to superiors and leaders juxtapose “obedience” against “serving the people” or “expectation of the public”. Almost seven percent see no difference or say there should be no difference.

Surprisingly, 23 percent answered “no” to our second question “*Have the most important values for being a good civil servant changed over the past two decades? If yes, which values have changed?*” Such respondents state the “core value of serving the people” never changes. Several argue that “basically” or “theoretically” there has been no change in values “even though methods of service and required skills are different.” However, about three quarters do think the most important values have changed, with 55 mentioning “serviceability” becoming more (45) as well as less important (10). Similarly, respondents mentioning “people-oriented” can be divided into two groups: One thinks the value is now more important, whereas a smaller group indicates the opposite: “The most important value change is moving from people-oriented to superior-oriented,” and “20 years ago, civil servants did public-centered work, but now they serve private

interests.” Respondents consider NPM-inspired values such as “innovativeness,” and rechtsstaat values “lawfulness,” “expertise,” and “transparency” more important than 20 years ago (all these were mentioned at least 25 times).

Again, about 23 percent answered no to our third question: “*Do you think being a good civil servant in Western and Eastern administrative cultures requires different values? If yes, please briefly describe the biggest difference.*” Many of these ‘universalists’ indicate that civil servants in both contexts should “serve the people and the society”, “the public”, meeting basic requirements like “impartiality,” “incorruptibility,” and being “people-oriented”. Of those emphasizing differences, the largest category (29 percent) suggest Chinese civil servants usually “serve the superior” or “a specific group,” while Western civil servants “are responsible for the citizen” and “serve the public”. They characterize this by saying: “The biggest difference is whether the civil servants are people-oriented and pursue the public interest to the max, or consider themselves only responsible to their superior,” and “The Eastern standard is satisfying the organization and its leaders; the Western standard is satisfying the objects of service”. 21 percent of respondents denoting differences explicitly distinguish between “rule of law” and “rule of morality”: “Eastern culture is a ‘sage’ culture, requiring a person be a perfect man; Western culture emphasizes individualism, respecting individual character and freedom. With regard to civil servants’ behavior in the workplace, in the East personal moral cultivation is emphasized] to do a good job; but in the West, the job is done by laws and institution”. The fourth biggest category sees institutional and systemic differences as most important, citing “democracy,” “independent administration” and “political neutrality” in the West vis-à-vis “more political influence” and “single-party politics” in Chinese civil service.

### **Dutch civil servants speak out**

Two hundred and thirty-one Dutch civil servants answered the first question, with 26 percent listing *practical and contextual factors to contrast ideal and actual preferences*. Statements in this category, for instance, mention limited time and resources, citing: “In the ideal situation all (good) plans can be realized; in the actual situation resources are scarce and choices have to be made”, “available resources: time and money” and “lack of resources”. A colleague adds to this: “The ideal remains a utopia which is often aimed but rarely achieved by mixing of emotions, self-interest and lack of knowledge”. A second category of about 24 percent concerns *specific values* which civil servants say differ in ideal-type and real-life contexts. The most frequently mentioned values are efficiency, effectiveness, and expertise. Particularly, Dutch civil servants consider efficiency an espoused rather than enacted value: “Many new procedures which are established with a view on the efficiency often do not work,” or even more explicit, “efficiency is a target which cannot always be achieved in the reality”. Arguably more surprising is the observation that in real-life “expertise is also considered less important,” “not the most important factor”, or “not always optimal.” Taken together, *political influence and organizational bureaucratic reasons* are the third main category containing about 21 percent of statements. Respondents suggest that “in the ideal situation, you act without the interests of external parties intervening in your work,” or “the controls of politics and management” create discrepancies between actual choices and civil servant’s personal values.

Here, only four percent answers “no” to question two. Dutch civil servants mention *four values frequently* when elaborating *changes during the last two decades*: efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and to a lesser extent accountability have become more important, with the first three values being mentioned more than 50 times each. The same goes for “innovativeness” and

“independent ideas” at the cost of “obedience,” “loyalty,” and “propriety.” Some respondents discuss this change from an *organizational or cultural perspective*. They emphasize that *NPM* makes the civil service more “businesslike”, “commercial”, “result-oriented” and “customized”. On the one hand, according to some, the civil service is targeting efficiency and performance too much: “more output (nowadays), less focus on outcome. In the past it was more 'outcome' (quality) oriented”. On the other hand, civil servants feel “this trend makes the civil service more efficient with less rules and bureaucratic barriers, giving civil servants more flexibility and autonomy to interpret and influence policy”. Smaller categories refer to individual change and citizen-infused change. These answers affirm considerable ambiguity, and arguably inconsistency among Dutch civil servants when compared to their cynical stance towards enactment of efficiency when answering the previous question. The sentiment portrayed here, however, does corroborate the ranking results.

Strikingly, almost half of our Dutch respondents state *Western and Eastern cultural contexts require different civil servant values*, and do so in very similar terms. In the East, they say, “civil servants have less autonomy to express their own opinions,” for reasons of “big controlled organizations” and a “state servant” culture. In addition, they feel Eastern civil servants are more loyal and obedient to superiors and leaders. Western civil servants considered themselves freer and less obedient: “The West is about free thinking, the East about following”, and: “I think that in an Eastern context assignments of superiors are executed more precisely, where in the West there’s room to bring in one's own ideas.” A second category here emphasizes individualism in Western culture, “less considering group and society as a whole” than Eastern collectivist culture. They expect duty towards the collective makes Eastern respondents “work more disciplined,” with “better cooperation”, and “dedication and dutifulness”. An intriguing statement indicating different understandings of “loyalty to group” states “what may be expected or demanded in some countries we would consider corruption.” In the same vein, about 10 percent emphasize “more transparency and openness makes Western civil service more equal, impartial and accountable,” while in the East “corruption is a big problem”. In this regard, they consider a “close political environment,” resulting in “less democracy” and “human rights protection inferior to the West.” Only five percent answers question three with “no.”

## **DISCUSSION**

In this section we theorize on our main findings, and we assess our research propositions. To start with, ideal-type value rankings show slightly more similarities than actual rankings. Moreover, they do not reflect traditional ethos more clearly. However, Chinese and Dutch respondents *explain incongruence between real-life and ideal-type values differently*. Ideal-type values in China are less congruent with classical notions of hierarchy whereas in the Netherlands they suggest “less managerialism and more ethics.” Indeed, respondents explain contrasts by identifying factors belonging to different governance traditions. Chinese civil servants voice serious worries about top-down government, fear of speaking out against superiors, and particularly flaws in their legal and governance systems (literally “a lack of rule of law”), making them act differently than they would prefer. Dutch respondents also mention political and organizational constraints but they emphasize limited time and resources due to overemphasis on efficiency – ranked low as ideal value – and “commercialization,” which weakens their ability to offer high quality public services without resulting in tangible efficiency gains. These findings from the respondents’ answers to open questions are congruent with recent sentiments conveyed by authors from both hemispheres

on the desirability of administrative culture based on rule of law (e.g., Wei 2010; Van der Meer 2011; Zheng 2009). Based on this combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence we cannot confirm propositions one, two, and four.

Second, *actual* value preferences of our respondents only partly reflect traditional flavors, so continuity in both traditions appears to be nominal (cf. Gross 1992). On the one hand, Chinese respondents show a strong hierarchical attachment to “person” and they see good interpersonal relationships as conducive to career development. The high ranking of obedience and oft-mentioned “superiors” and “leaders” corroborate classical imagery of power distance (cf. Schwarz 1999). In addition, high rankings of incorruptibility and impartiality are consistent with rule of morality ethos. On the other hand, we also see strong preference for Weberian lawfulness and expertise, and to a lesser extent NPM-inspired values such as effectiveness, efficiency, innovativeness, and serviceability (cf. Kernaghan 2000). In addition, Chinese respondents express a high interest in serving on behalf of the people, a principle promoted by Marxist-Leninist ideology, which claims that the proletariat represents the interest of most people and the rights conferred by the people (Jiang 2011; Xiong 2003). Because they simultaneously rank low democratic values expressing the same sentiment, accountability, transparency, serviceability, we may also interpret the preference to serve the people as instrumental to regime legitimization.

In the same vein, real-life value preferences of Dutch respondents portray a mix of Weberian, rule of law values such as accountability, expertise, lawfulness, loyalty, and reliability, as well as modern NPM-inspired values such as innovativeness, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and serviceability. As such, they resemble results of similar recent studies in Western Europe (Van der Wal 2013a; Van der Wal et al. 2008b). However, our findings differ from such studies in the low rankings of impartiality, incorruptibility, and honesty. Only complacency towards or self-evidence of these values in the Dutch civil service might explain these striking findings, which merit further study in itself. All in all, we feel confident in rejecting proposition three, whereas our qualitative results only partly support proposition five.

Finally, mutual perceptions portray more consensus on cultural and traditional differences than the rankings itself (cf. Van Steden *et al.* 2013). In fact, they reinforce stereotypes and cliché-type differences (cf. Van der Wal and De Graaf 2007). A majority of both groups emphasizes differences between Eastern and Western civil servant values, contrasting obedience to superiors and organizational and political control in China’s civil service with a more autonomous, individualistic and transparent civil service culture in the Netherlands. However, prorated almost five times as much Chinese respondents state no differences (should) exist between both groups. This may very well be another indication of desired value convergence with their Western counterparts. Chinese respondents emphasizing differences do refer to “rule of morality” or “rule of law” traditions, sometimes, literally, whereas Dutch civil servants juxtapose collectivism to individualism. Overall, we feel confident in confirming research proposition six.

## **LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH**

Before we conclude, we explicate three limitations which undoubtedly affected the outcomes of our study. First of all, we should not be naïve in blindly accepting civil servants’ accounts of their public service ethos: Interviewing or surveying individuals about their own conduct, values, or motivations inevitably suffers from a degree of social desirability bias (Van der Wal 2013b). Indeed, the high ranking of incorruptibility as actual value by civil servants in a country with vast corruption problems might be testimony to this, although many corruption scandals concern high-

level “political” party officials rather than rank-and-file civil servants. However, by producing both ideal-type and real-life value rankings, and additional qualitative assessments of value preferences, we partly mitigate this shortcoming.

Second, Confucianism has always played crucial role in Chinese administrative culture, but the influence of Communism on civil servants nowadays is undeniable. However, we did not include Marxism-Leninism and Maoism in our discussion of “tradition”. As Holmes (1993, 158-159) suggests, no matter how hard the Communist leadership tried to discard Confucianism or how much the Communism affected value system after 1949 in China, it is a product of “traditional political culture” such as “weak tradition of the rule of law” rather than tradition in a deeper sense. In contrast, Confucian ideals of good governance which propagate “a ruling class, the members of which were superior by virtue of their moral character and training”, have been present for more than a thousand years, especially with the firm establishment of civil service examination system during the T’ang era (A.D. 618-906) (Callis 1959, 91).

Third, as elaborated before, we employed a triangulation of data types which is not undisputed. How useful, then, was such a combination and to what extent did the methods used result in relevant knowledge about the prominence and role of values in both countries? Most particularly, each component resulted in slightly different yet complementary images of what civil servants value most. These findings, which relate to *conclusions about content rather than being separate from them*, offer interesting suggestions for measurement and interpretation of civil servant values. A key question that remains is how civil servants from different traditions understand and interpret, and thus, enact, similar concrete value statements such as loyalty and transparency, even though we alleviated this by presenting identical definitions to our respondents. In-depth qualitative interviewing and focus groups would be one way to address this question; indeed, we are currently conducting a follow-up project with such methodology, focusing on a selection of five key values.

## CONCLUSION

In our concluding section we address our central research questions: *How and why do ideal-type and real-life value rankings differ between Chinese and Dutch civil servants?* and, *Do differences reflect administrative traditions of both countries?* To start with the “how”; real-life and ideal-type value hierarchies produced by civil servants are as different as they are similar, with few strong local accents, although real-life rankings are more different than ideal type rankings. Prominent values for both groups such as lawfulness, expertise, impartiality, and effectiveness indeed seem rather universalistic given their propagated importance across the globe. Widely divergent actual rankings for obedience and transparency corroborate the starkest contrasts between both administrative cultures, while rankings of reliability and incorruptibility simply leave us bewildered. Both countries’ distinctive traditional imagery of being a “good civil servant,” and global public management reforms with converging vocabulary as a mitigating force in practice, might lead one to expect larger differences between ideal-type value rankings than between real-life value rankings.

However, looking back, we realize it is more likely to be reversed. This is where we answer the “why” part of our first question. Ideal values are aspired to but also difficult to achieve, bounded by deeply rooted and inert practices and belief systems which transpire into actual values-in-use. Indeed, Chinese civil servants explain incongruence between ideal-type and real-life values by more fundamental, systemic constraints and unease, whereas Dutch civil servants emphasize



meso-level factors related to organizational culture. Overall, based on this study we conclude that civil servant values in both countries are less contrasting and less consistent than administrative traditions and exiguous existing studies suggest. Clearly, this is evidenced by the fact that we can only convincingly confirm one out of six research hypotheses based on our data. This proposition concerns mutual perceptions which display classical contrasts, and evidence deep-lying clichés and prejudice, particularly among our Dutch respondents.

To summarize, we report five main findings which merit further testing in future studies:

1. Both Chinese and Dutch civil servants aspire to a rule of law ethos
2. Chinese civil servants attribute incongruence between ideal-type and real-life values to systemic and institutional constraints; Dutch civil servants attribute such incongruence to ill-executed NPM reforms
3. Rule of morality and rule of law traditions have limited explanatory power for differences between ideal-type value preferences of Chinese and Dutch civil servants
4. Mutually perceived differences exceed real-life differences between value preferences of Chinese and Dutch civil servants
5. Mutually perceived differences between values refer to traditional cultural characteristics more clearly than differences between ideal-type and real-life value rankings of Chinese and Dutch civil servants

Amidst all that is still unclear it is evident we cannot simply differentiate any more between “Eastern” and “Western” values and administrative cultures, or between “rule of morality” and “rule of law” (cf. Winston 2005). Globalization and convergence of management ideas and vocabulary between East and West may very well continue (Mahbubani 2013) yet stable differences in governance contexts and vested interests in the status quo – particularly in China – will produce increasing value conflict prior to tangible value convergence.

We compared ideal-type and real-life rankings and mutual perceptions because they might show us whether traditions are evolving, and how structures might transform accordingly (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Our findings provide tentative evidence for Bevir et al.’s (2003) claim that new characteristics are formed during generational transmission of traditions, but much work lies ahead of us. We hope our study inspires scholars to develop an ambitious research agenda for rigorous cross-national studies into evolving practices of administrative ethics.

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<sup>1</sup> Here, ‘traditional’ means the time from the pre-Qin Period to the 1911 Xinhai Revolution (Lu Yu 2009). This Revolution ended the Qing Period, which signaled the end of feudalism in China. The ‘pre-Qin Period’ is a general term indicating the whole time before the Qin Period (221BC). It contains the Xia Dynasty, Shang Dynasty, Zhou Dynasty, the Spring-Autumn, and the Warring States Period. Confucius lived in the Spring-Autumn Period and Confucian thought stems from this period.

<sup>2</sup> The “rule of man” and “rule of morality” are fundamentally the same. The man in the context of Confucian administration means moral elite. It is also called “the rule of virtuous men” (Painter and Peters 2010, 27).

<sup>3</sup> Recent attention to rampant corruption scandals culminated in an unprecedented campaign by the central government to provide ethics training to all its 7 million civil servants. See e.g., Forbes, 2 February 2013, or CCTV, 21 October 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Characters and related values derived from classical Confucian texts (with characters in simplified Chinese):

Confucian value	Related values
Ren 仁	Humaneness Kindness Benevolence Friendliness Serviceability
Li 礼	Propriety Courteousness Cautiousness Humility Responsibility
Yi 义	Righteousness Justice
Zhong 忠	Loyalty Obedience Selflessness Reliability
Xiao 孝	Filial piety Loyalty / Obedience
Cheng-xin 诚信	Integrity Trustfulness Faithfulness Honesty Reliability
Qian-rang 谦让	Humility/ Modesty Respectfulness Generousness
Shu 恕	Tolerance

	Consideration Reciprocity
Qin-jian 勤俭	Diligence Thrift Incorruption Self-reliance Dedication
Zhi 智	Wisdom Expertise
Yong 勇	Courage Righteousness

<sup>5</sup> Cluster results for the administrative ethics literature (Van der Wal 2013:63):

Cluster	Total		
1 Honesty	434	16 Cooperativeness	191
2 Humaneness	422	17 Responsiveness	184
3 Social justice	402	18 Dedication	183
4 Impartiality	380	19 Effectiveness	181
5 Transparency	379	20 Innovativeness	179
6 Integrity	365	21 Lawfulness	152
7 Obedience	357	22 Loyalty	146
8 Reliability	329	23 Consistency	111
9 Responsibility	327	24 Autonomy	99
10 Expertise	314	25 Stability	99
11 Accountability	294	26 Representativeness	88
12 Efficiency	276	27 Competitiveness	77
13 Courage	254	28 Profitability	59
14 Prudence	220	29 Collegiality	48
15 Serviceability	215	30 Self-fulfillment	16

<sup>6</sup> Each value in the Confucian context is defined based on its meaning in terms of governance. The definitions of the values in the European context are derived mostly from Van der Wal's (2013) research. We used the latter for values that appeared in both lists.

<sup>7</sup> State codes of conduct are: the 'State Civil Service Code of Conduct' and the 'Program for Improving Citizens' Moral Education.' The provincial codes come from: Jilin province (three codes); Shandong; Inner Mongolia; Hubei; Sichuan; Guangxi; Beijing; and Shanghai. The municipal codes are from: Nanjing (Jiangsu province); Jiaozuo (Henan province); Huangshan, Anqing (Anhui province); Baoji (Shaanxi province); Chengdu (Sichuan province); Dongguan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen (Guangdong province); Qingdao (Shandong province); Urumchi (Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region); Xi-an (Shaanxi province); Jilin (Jilin province); and Hangzhou (Zhejiang province).